OT Remote Access: Zero Trust with a Switch-Based Gateway, Not VPN
Cisco and its partners argue that remote access to OT networks should rely on ZTNA with a gateway built into the industrial switch, rather than VPNs and port forwarding. The thesis comes from vendors, but the checklist it yields is useful to anyone managing remote maintenance.
On November 16, 2026, IIoT World published a summary of an ICS Cybersecurity Day session on zero trust remote access for OT networks. Speakers included Ruben Lobo and Pete Kavanagh (Cisco), Tim Householder (Worldwide Technology), and moderator Kevin Wood (Cisco). The thesis: remote access for vendors and integrators should be built on ZTNA with the gateway inside the industrial switch, not on VPNs and port forwarding.
A necessary caveat: most of the speakers are Cisco employees, so the content reflects a vendor perspective, and the article reports no independent data or measured results. It does, however, offer a realistic description of problems many plants know well.
Where the Risk Comes From
The session pointed to three recurring sources of exposure:
- VPNs and firewall rules that never get removed. Tunnels created for vendor and integrator maintenance stay active: the "infinite firewall rule" problem. Auditing them takes weeks or months in multi-site companies, because each plant manages access in its own way. Meanwhile, plant technicians spend time watching contractor laptops for the whole duration of a session.
- Port forwarding on cellular modems. In transportation and critical infrastructure, service providers install modems with public IPs and forward ports from the internet to industrial assets. These often expose HTTP administration interfaces and have no firewall functions: once a device is reached, lateral movement within the segment is possible.
- OEM shadow IT. OEMs and integrators embed cellular gateways in machines, often without the owner's knowledge. In one case cited, during a data acquisition review a customer discovered an undeclared connection to a cloud data historian.
On the third point, SBOMs help only for recently purchased equipment; for the installed base, visibility tools and deep packet inspection are more effective.
The Question of Gateway Placement
According to the session, most ZTNA implementations place the gateway in the DMZ or at a higher Purdue level. As a result, the IPs of OT assets (drives, I/O, sensors) must be made reachable upward through NAT and zone firewalls, flattening segmentation. Cisco's approach instead runs the gateway as a software function on industrial switches and routers, behind NAT and zone firewalls, while the trust broker stays in the cloud (Cisco IoT Operations Dashboard).
The result, it is claimed, is a firewall configuration reduced to a single outbound rule on port 443. Integration with NAC can prevent lateral movement: someone authorized on one drive cannot reach neighboring devices.
The Claimed Benefits
Among the advantages cited, all of which need field verification:
- time-limited sessions, with MFA, posture checks, and IdP integration;
- centralized session logging and scheduling;
- no dedicated gateway hardware to buy and patch, with fewer supply chain concerns;
- no extension of VDI into control zones, which would weaken Purdue and IEC 62443 conduits.
Zero trust in OT is a strategy, not a product purchase.
What to Do in Practice
The original page is truncated before the section on first steps, so we cannot report it. The checklist that emerges from the article, however, is vendor-independent:
- inventory permanent VPNs and firewall rules;
- identify cellular gateways installed by OEMs;
- check where remote access gateways sit relative to segmentation boundaries;
- move to per-session, per-asset access.
Vendor remote access is a common and poorly audited entry point into control networks. Whether you adopt Cisco's solution, another vendor's, or a different architecture, the value lies in the principle: temporary, single-asset, fully logged access that does not compromise segmentation.